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New technology in the field of fertility has allowed for increased production of 
human embryos.  Several conflicts occur given this increased number of 
cryogenically frozen embryos.  One such conflict is what to do with left over frozen 
embryos when couples or individuals have decided that they have enough children or 
no longer want children.  Another issue is what to do with the embryos when a 
couple disagrees as to whether they should be used.  In trying to address these 
concerns, one must decide whether an embryo should be treated as property.  If so, to 
whom does this property belong?  If an embryo cannot be fit neatly into the domain 
of property and be apportioned through such channels, can the realm of contract law 
dictate the answer? 
This Article addresses the conflicts that arise due to the increased number of 
cryogenically frozen embryos produced during in vitro fertilization (IVF).  Part I 
discusses the IVF process, in general. While it recognizes the man’s role in the 
process, it focuses primarily on the physical and emotional hardships that are placed 
on the woman.  Part I also gives the backdrop of the case law in the area of embryo 
distribution.  Part II introduces the idea that an embryo should be reduced to private 
property, through utilization of the labor and economic theories of property law.  
Additionally, an embryo’s use, rather than its waste, promotes a more efficient 
society.  The role that the legislature should play in the appropriation of embryonic 
property is also addressed.  The dominion of property law suggests that the 
enforcement of contracts is eminent to communal survival.  Part III discusses the 
current regulations in place as well as the lack of direction given by these regulations 
when a dispute arises as to the distribution of embryos.  Part IV discusses how 
contracts with IVF clinics meet the standard elements of enforceability in contract 
law.  This article also addresses the current criticisms and possible defenses against 
such enforcement.  Part V synthesizes the findings of the previous articles written on 
this topic.  The conclusion is that where a dispute arises concerning the use of 
embryos, the party seeking to use or implant the embryos should prevail unless a 
contract governing the dispute exists.  Where an enforceable contract exists, that 
contract should govern the distribution. 
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I.  BACKGROUND 
IVF allows for couples or individuals, experiencing fertility problems, to increase 
their chances of procreation.  IVF is most often used when a pathologic fallopian 
tube is unable to transport eggs to the uterus, where implantation into the uterine wall 
and fertilization by the sperm must occur.1  Women undergoing IVF are exposed to 
significant medical risks.2 To minimize the exposure to these risks, doctors can 
retrieve and fertilize the eggs and then cryogenically freeze excess eggs for future 
use should the initial attempt be unsuccessful.3  The freezing of fertilized eggs for 
future implantation attempts reduces the physiological manipulation of the woman’s 
reproductive system. That is, she will be forced to hormonally prepare for egg 
retrieval to take place only once.4  If the eggs are fertilized and developed normally, 
then the embryos are transferred to the woman’s uterus.  Typically, multiple embryos 
are transferred to increase the likelihood of pregnancy.  If more than four eggs 
develop into embryos, the donor may have the option of cryopreserving the 
remaining embryos for thawing and replacement in a later IVF cycle.5 
Three pivotal cases have marked the issues, progression, and struggling 
ideologies associated with litigation over the excess frozen embryos.  The first was 
York v. Jones, heard in the Eastern District of Virginia in 1989.6 This case involved a 
custody dispute between a couple participating in the IVF program, the Yorks, and 
the IVF clinic, the Jones Institute.7 After four failed attempts at achieving pregnancy, 
the Yorks subsequently moved to another state and sought to have the remaining 
embryos transferred to an IVF clinic in that state.8  The Jones Institute refused to 
                                                                
1Tanya Feliciano, Davis v. Davis:  What About Future Disputes?, 26 CONN. L. REV. 305, 
306-07 (1993). 
2Donna A. Katz, My Egg, Your Sperm, Whose Preembryo? A Proposal for Deciding 
Which Party Receives Custody of Frozen Preembryos, 5 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 623, 629 
(1998)(“including ovarian hyperstimulation syndrome, bleeding, infection, cysts, anesthesia-
related complications, and possibly an increased risk of thromboembolism, stroke myocardial 
infarction and ovarian cancer, as well as difficult pregnancies and deliveries,” citing Peter J. 
Neumann, Should Health Insurance Cover IVF?  Issues and Options, 22 J. HEALTH POL., 
POL’Y & L. 1215, 1226 (1997)). 
3Id. (citing Monica Shah, Modern Reproductive Technologies:  Legal Issues Concerning 
Cryopreservation and Posthumous Conception, 17 J. LEGAL MED. 547, 550 (1996). 
4Id. at 629-30 (citing Monica Shah, Modern Reproductive Technologies:  Legal Issues 
Concerning Cryopreservation and Posthumous Conception, 17 J. LEGAL MED. 547, 550 
(1996) and Jennifer Marigliano Dehmel, To Have or Not to Have: Whose Procreative Rights 
Prevail in Disputes Over Disposition of Frozen Embryos? 27 CONN. L. REV. 1377, 1380 
(1995). 
5In Vitro Fertilization (IVF), Microsoft Encarta Online Encyclopedia (2003), at 
http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_761577126/in_vitro_fertilization.html (last visited Nov. 
21, 2003); Wash. State Dept of Health, Information Summary and Recommendations, at 
http://www.doh.wa.gov/hsqa/sunrise/2000/infertility.doc (last visited Nov. 21, 2003). 
6York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989).  
7Id. at 422.  
8Id. at 423-24. 
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relinquish custody of the embryos.9  The court held that an agreement signed by the 
Yorks created a bailor-bailee relationship with the Jones institute, stating that “all 
that is needed is the element of lawful possession however created, and duty to 
account for the thing as the property of another that creates the bailment[.]”10  The 
holding reflects this court’s view that embryos are property, and when an IVF clinic 
takes possession of the embryos, the clinic may refuse to allow the couple’s embryos 
to be transferred elsewhere for implantation.11 
The next piece of jurisprudence was set in place in 1992 by the Tennessee 
Supreme Court in Davis v. Davis.12  This case involved a dispute between a divorced 
couple over the disposition of seven frozen embryos in an IVF clinic.13  Mr. and Mrs. 
Davis had experienced five ectopic pregnancies and seven failed IVF attempts 
costing over $35,000.14  When adoption failed, the Davis’ had their seven excess 
eggs frozen for future implantation attempts.15  Before implantation could be 
performed, Mr. Davis filed for divorce.  The only contested issue in the divorce was 
the disposition of the frozen embryos.16  Mrs. Davis originally wished to have the 
embryos implanted into her own body but subsequently decided that she wished to 
have them donated to an infertile couple.17  Mr. Davis opposed the implantation of 
the embryos into Mrs. Davis given that he did not wish to father any more children 
and, especially any child that would not live with both biological parents.18  
Additionally, Mr. Davis did not wish to donate the embryos to an infertile couple due 
to his inability to control the psychological trauma that child may suffer with that 
couple if they should, for example, divorce.19  The Tennessee Supreme Court 
concluded that a more compelling interest lies in that of the party wishing to avoid 
procreation, assuming that the party wishing to become a parent had other reasonable 
means to do so (other than the embryos in question).20  Citing the American Fertility 
Society guidelines, that the court stated, the embryos “are not, strictly speaking, 
either ‘persons’ or ‘property,’ but occupy an interim category that entitles them to 
special respect because of their potential for human life.”21  The absence of a 
preliminary agreement, case or statutory law, and the fact that Mrs. Davis did not 
                                                                
9Id. 
10Id. at 425 (internal citation omitted).  
11York, 717 F. Supp. at 425. 
12Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992). 
13Id. at 589. 
14Id. at 591. 
15Id. at 592. 
16Id.  
17Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 589-90. 
18Id. at 604.  
19Id. 
20Id.   
21Id. at 597. 
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want the embryos for implantation into her own body allowed for Mr. Davis’ privacy 
interest to compel a verdict in his favor.   
Six years later, the New York Court of Appeals ruled on a similar case. Unlike 
the Davis case, in Kass v. Kass, at the time of the divorce proceedings the donor 
mother, Mrs. Kass, sought to implant the embryos into her own body.22  This 
presented what would seem to be a stronger case for implantation.23  After ten failed 
attempts at IVF, costing more than $75,000, the Kass’ decided to have the five 
excess eggs from their final attempt frozen.24  As in the Davis case, the donor father, 
Mr. Kass, objected to the implantation, raising his privacy interest through arguing 
the “burdens of unwanted fatherhood.”25  This case is distinguishable from the Davis 
case, though, given that the Kass’ previously entered into a contract with the IVF 
clinic allowing the IVF clinic to use the embryos for biological research or discard 
them as the clinic sees fit, should the couple disagree as to the embryos disposition.26  
After stating that the embryos were not “persons” within the meaning of the 
constitution, the highest court in New York held that the intent of the parties was 
expressed clearly and unambiguously in the contract with the IVF clinic and as such 
should be presumed valid and binding.27  The court applied practical principles of 
contract law to decide the case but added in a footnote that such a contract may be 
precluded due to substantially changed circumstances or void as to public policy.28 
In synthesizing these cases, it seems that where there is an absence of case law or 
statutory guidance, courts will look to whether the embryo is property.29  If it is 
determined that the embryo is property, then it will be disposed of as such.30  If it is 
not property, instead something entitled to special respect, then the interest of the 
parties are to be weighed when making the decision.31  Where there exists a contract 
clearly stating the parties’ intent as to the disposition of the embryos should a dispute 
arise, that contract seems to govern regardless of whether embryos are property.32  
But can an entity, which may not be property, with the potential for human life fit 
neatly into the confines of contract law or should such contracts be governed by a 
special set of principles?   
                                                                
22Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174-75 (N.Y. 1998). 
23Luigi Brandimarte, Sperm Plus Egg Equals One “Boiled” Debate: Kass v. Kass and The 
Fate of the Frozen Pre-Zygotes, 17 N.Y.L. Sch. J. Hum. Rts. 767 (2000). 
24Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 175-77. 
25Id. at 175. 
26Id. at 177. 
27Id. at 179. 
28Id. at 175, 179-82. 
29See York, 717 F. Supp. at 421.  
30Id. 
31See supra notes 12-21.  
32See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 588. 
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II.  EMBRYONIC MATERIAL AS PROPERTY 
What is property?  Property rights evolved from a somewhat unitary 
concept, of material objects controlled by individuals, to the concept of an 
infinitely divisible bundle of rights — to minerals, air, light, access, water, 
expected returns, occupancy, exclusive use, etc., rights which are subject 
to multiple ownership and to numerous mixes of public…and individual 
claims.33 
Various theories govern allocation of property.  To exemplify how embryos would 
be viewed if they were merely property, one may examine embryos in light of both 
the labor and economic theories of property.  It was from these two theories that 
much of today’s property rights were born.34   
A.  Labor/ Lockean Theory Of Property 
The labor theory of property embodies the idea that everyone is entitled to the 
fruits of his or her labor.35  This philosophy is coined the Lockean theory, after the 
works of John Locke.  Locke believed that one’s own person was their primary 
possession and that the labor exerted  
by an individual is an extension of the person and thus is the exclusive 
right of that person.  Thus, by mixing one’s ‘labor’ with a good … one 
‘adds value’ to the good and one thus acquires ownership in that good.  As 
a result, an individual has a justified interest in a good when he has added 
value to that good by exerting labor.36 
In the process of IVF, a woman’s body labors through manipulation of her 
reproductive system in the hormonal preparation for egg retrieval, consumes 
prescription fertility medication, endures the process of egg retrieval, endures the 
process of egg implantation, and deals with psychological stress.37  The 
psychological stress may very well be brought about by aspirations of a successful 
attempt as well as the knowledge of the risks to women associated with IVF.38   
The risks associated with the medication the woman must consume prior to and 
after egg retrieval include bruising and soreness with any injectable medications as 
well as ovarian hyperstimulation syndrome which “can lead to dehydration, large 
amounts of fluid accumulation in the abdominal and lung cavities, blood clotting 
                                                                
33Donald A. Krueckeberg, The difficult character of property: to whom do things belong?,  
J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N, June 22, 1995, at 61. 
34JESSIE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 15-17, 136, 763-765, 774-775 (Aspen 
Publishers 4th ed. 1998). 
35Id. at 15.  
36Joan E. Schaffner, Patent Preemption Unlocked, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 1081, 1087 (1995) 
(citing JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT ¶ 27, and Justin Hughes, The 
Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 289 (1993)).  
37Katz, supra note 2, at 629. 
38Id.  
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disorders, and kidney damage.”39 Soft data also supports a possible link to ovarian 
cancer.40  
The transvaginal egg retrieval process is an ultrasound-guided procedure in 
which “a long, thin needle is passed through the vagina into the ovary.  Although 
women are under sedation or local anesthesia, this procedure can cause mild to 
moderate discomfort … Structures near the ovaries, such as the bladder, bowel, or 
blood vessels, could possibly be injured and require further surgery.”41  Additionally, 
bleeding from the ovary and infections are possible.42   
Egg retrieval may also be accomplished through a laparoscopic procedure, where 
a small incision in the abdomen is made.43   The risks, here, include “major injury to 
the bladder, bowel, uterus, blood vessels, or other pelvic structures . . .  If injury 
occurs, further surgery may be required.”44  Infections and anesthesia complications 
are also possible.45 
Risks to the woman’s body are also present in the embryo transfer procedure.46  
“The transfer of embryos may cause mild irritation to the cervix or uterus.”47  The 
implantation of more than one embryo increases the chances of pregnancy but also 
increases the likelihood that the risks associated with egg transfer will occur.48   
While it cannot be argued that the male counterpart does not also experience the 
psychological hardship and the “emotional rollercoaster” involved in failed IVF 
attempts, a man does not face the same risks nor endure the bodily labor as that of 
the woman.49  “Because the process of egg donation is much more physically 
invasive than sperm donation, egg donation requires the assistance of a physician, 
while sperm donation is easily accomplished without any physician assistance.”50 
The fact that Locke placed such a high value on ownership of one’s body and one’s 
bodily labor, suggests that application of a Lockean theory would dictate awarding 
women with a property right in the remaining embryos.   
                                                                
39AM. SOC’Y FOR REPROD. MED., FACT SHEET, RISKS OF IN VITRO FERTILIZATION (IVF) 
(1996), at http://www.asrm.org/Patients/Factsheets/RisksIVF-Fact.pdf (last visited Nov. 21, 










49Michael L. Jackson, Fatherhood and the Law: Reproductive Rights and Responsibilities 
of Men, 9 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 53, 94 n.127 (1999). 
50Id. 
2002-03] FROZEN EMBRYOS 109 
Locke also identifies two important conditions designed to protect the 
“liberty” interest of the public which must be satisfied and which impose 
limitations on what can justly be reduced to private property – the 
“enough and as good condition” and the ‘non-waste’ condition.  The 
“enough and as good” condition protects against over-consumption .… 
The “non-waste” condition requires that one [is] only appropriate that 
which one can effectively use without any spoiling ….  The result is that 
an  individual who has exerted labor and added value to a good still may 
not be justified in claiming a property interest if it will result in waste or 
violate the enough and as good condition.51 
Therefore, the primary principle in Locke’s theory is that one who has added the 
most value to a good or property through bodily labor lay the best claim to that 
property, but only to the extent that that person’s appropriation of the property does 
not result in waste.52 
Locke’s principle theory that adding one’s labor to property is what gives that 
person the right to possession. The rationale is that the person who adds value to 
property should be so rewarded with ownership.  Therefore, an argument could be 
made that the party who exerts the most bodily labor should not be the determining 
factor, but instead, award ownership to the party that adds the most value.  The male 
IVF participant may then argue that his sperm donation is just as crucial to bringing 
the embryo to life as the bodily labor the woman endures, and thus, it adds the same 
amount of value.  The IVF clinic may also argue that without its labor, the embryo 
could not exist.  The answer lies in the conditions set forth in Locke’s theory.  The 
underlying maxims in the “enough and as good” and “non-waste” conditions place a 
limitation on the party asserting a property right that will allow for the property to 
“spoil” or go unused.53 
Two possible scenarios highlight Locke’s view.  Where the donating woman, the 
donating man, and the IVF clinic are competing for the embryos, all with the 
intention of putting them to use, Locke would award the embryos to the woman.  
Locke’s primary principle is that property should be awarded first and foremost to 
the party that expends the most bodily labor.  Between the woman, the man, and the 
IVF clinic, the woman expends more of her person, through mixing more of her 
labor, to produce the embryo.  
An exception lies in Locke’s primary principle where the person exerting the 
most labor does not choose to utilize the resource, allowing it to “spoil.”54  Thus, 
where the woman does not wish to attempt to give life to the embryo but the man 
does, the woman’s labor will be preempted and the embryo will be awarded to the 
party seeking the embryo’s use and has added the most value.  The argument that the 
man has added equal value will be used to preempt the woman’s argument of 
supreme bodily labor, where the woman does not seek the use of the embryo. 
                                                                
51Schaffner, supra note 36, at 1088 (citing Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-
Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE 
L.J. 1533, 1547 (1993), Locke, supra note 36, ¶¶ 27, 31, and Hughes, supra note 36, 296-98). 
52See supra note 35, at 15 and note 36, at 1087-88. 
53See supra note 51.  
54Schaffner, supra note 36, at 1088. 
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Therefore, according to Lockean theory, the primary concern in awarding property 
rights, is who exerted the most labor.55  Then one will look to who will allow for 
utilization of the embryo.56  Where the person mixing his/her own labor will allow 
for the embryo to spoil, property rights will be awarded to another individual who 
added value to the embryo and will allow for the embryo to be used.57  In the Davis 
case, a woman wanted to use the embryos and the man did not.  Under the Lockean 
theory, the woman would be said to have a stronger property interest in the embryos 
because she exerted the most bodily labor, and she wanted to implant the embryos. 
Donors seeking to avoid the implantation of the embryos argue that another 
exception should exist to Locke’s theory of supreme bodily labor.58 This exception 
lies in the donor privacy interest in the avoidance of unwanted parenthood.59  In the 
Davis case, such an argument was made by Mr. Davis and accepted by the court.60 
The attractiveness of a Lockean moral philosophy approach is that it 
provides the Court with a principled basis for deciding privacy cases, a 
basis which would temper the Court’s past desire to recognize individual 
rights to the exclusion of other societal concerns … Under the Lockean 
liberal tradition, an individual’s natural law duty to preserve both the life 
of, and capacity for rational liberty in, his fellow man limit that 
individual’s natural rights.61 
Therefore, it has been determined that where one mixes his/her own labor with a 
resource, adds value to it, and intends to utilize the resource without allowing for it 
to spoil, he/she should be awarded ownership.62  The next question is whether a 
competing interest, like privacy, would preempt such ownership.  When analyzing 
the nature of a privacy interest asserted, one must look to whether the act from which 
the individual seeks defense is one that “truly affects the individual’s capacity for 
rational deliberation and self-direction.  [In the instant situation, if the use of the 
embryos would truly affect the donor seeking to avoid parenthood’s individual 
capacity for rational deliberation and self-direction.] If the asserted privacy interest 
does directly involve the individual’s rational liberty it should be classified as 
‘fundamental.’”63  Where the privacy interest sought to be protected is 
“fundamental,” any claim seeking to override that privacy interest must overcome a 
test of “strict scrutiny.”64  It “must [be] show[n] that the capacity for rational 
                                                                
55See supra notes 35-36. 
56See supra note 51. 
57See supra notes 35-36, 51. 
58See supra notes 19-20, 25. 
59Id. 
60See supra note 18. 
61Jeffrey S. Koehlinger, Substantive Due Process Analysis and the Lockean Liberal 
Tradition: Rethinking the Modern Privacy Cases, 65 IND. L.J. 723, 742 (1990). 
62See supra notes 35-36, 51. 
63Koehlinger, supra note 61, at 742-43. 
64Id. at 743. 
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deliberation and self-direction in others is significantly restricted or inhibited by the 
unregulated exercise of the asserted privacy interest.”65  Where a privacy interest did 
not involve an individual’s capacity for rational liberty, it would not be fundamental 
and would only be subject to a test of “rational basis.”66  In a “rational basis” review, 
“any rational purpose for the regulation would usually be sufficient.”67 
Unquestionably, becoming a parent, especially when parenthood is unwanted, 
interferes with one’s rational liberty.  In some states, a sperm donor can avoid 
parental responsibility by following certain statutory procedures.68  However, the 
vast majority of states fail to shield a sperm donor from the responsibilities 
associated with full parenthood, where the woman seeking implantation is unmarried 
and the sperm donor is identifiable.69  As one judge put it, “[W]oe be it to the bio-dad 
who presumes to avoid his responsibility to support his child when no other 
presumed father asserts paternity.”70  Additionally, the psychological ramifications of 
knowing that you have a biological child out in the world may also be quite 
burdensome on some men.  Given this interference with one’s rational liberty, 
granting a woman the right to implant an embryo in her body where the man no 
longer wishes to complete IVF questions a “fundamental” privacy interest of the 
man.  Therefore, one must decide whether a woman’s desire to implant the embryo 
survives a “strict scrutiny” test.71 
There are times where factors, such as the likelihood of the party asserting use of 
the embryos being able to achieve parenthood through other reasonable means, come 
into play. According to the Lockean theory, a party seeking to use the embryos must 
show that rational deliberation and self-direction in others is significantly restricted 
or inhibited by the non-implantation of the embryos.72  It is obvious that the failure to 
implant the embryos will inhibit the deliberation and ability to self-direct for the 
potential life that may result from each embryo.  The problem is that if the embryo is 
property and not a human life, the effects to that potential life cannot be accounted 
for in Locke’s quantitative method of balancing privacy versus the overall good.  
What can be accounted for are the effects that discarding the embryo will have on 
those who are living.  Just as parenthood affects the party who does not wish for it, 
parenthood even more so affects the party who plans to be in the child’s life.  The 
ability to force parenthood on someone is juxtaposed with the ability to deny 
someone the ability to become a parent.  Thus, in situations where a party has no 
other reasonable means to become a parent, the privacy interest of the party arguing 
non-use of the embryos is outweighed by the party seeking use of the embryos, 




68Judge Robert D. Monarch, In re Marriage of Buzzanca: Trial Court Analysis, 26 W. ST. 
U. L. REV. 1 (1999) (citing Cal. Fam. Code § 7613 (West 1994)).  
69MAUREEN H. MONKS, ET AL., CH. 1 REPRESENTING NONTRADITIONAL FAMILIES 
(Massachusetts Continuing Legal Education, Inc. 2001). 
70Monarch, supra note 68, at 7. 
71See supra note 63-64. 
72See supra notes 64-65. 
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especially in the case of multiple embryos being implanted into different women.  In 
this case, capacity for rational deliberation and self-direction is significantly 
restricted.   
However, where the women have other reasonable means of achieving 
parenthood, a different outcome may be warranted.  Although the tribulations 
endured by Mrs. Davis and Mrs. Kass prior to the freezing of the embryos seem to 
dictate another line of reasoning,73 courts may decide that it is not unreasonable to 
have the party go through these procedures again.74  Little to no significance is given 
to monetary or psychological costs.75  Although treating the embryo as property may 
forbid the analysis of how the choices will affect the potential life of an embryo, one 
can look to the effects on those already living.  In this examination, one may look as 
to how the community at large would suffer from the lack of that life coming to be.  
The problem revolves around how one would measure the benefits that potential life 
could bring to society.  Just as easily as one could argue the possibility of that 
embryo resulting in a future president, medical researcher, or any other productive 
citizen, the same could be argued that the embryo may result in a serial killer, 
deviant, or other non-productive member of society.  The tie-breaker to this struggle 
lies in how Locke reveres morality.  In the current application of Locke’s theory of 
persons, “[t]hese are the feelings we call on when arguing for housing for the 
homeless, health care for the poor, and inoculations and education for poor children.  
Such arguments are at bottom about the distribution of property, and are decided to a 
significant extent by how you define property.”76  To Locke, a property interest will 
only be recognized where, with a person’s own bodily labor, one adds value to that 
property.77  “Value is measured by the usefulness of the product to society.”78  Labor 
“which produces something useful—adds value to society—deserves to be 
rewarded.”79  Therefore, what Locke values is that which is useful where a discarded 
embryo cannot be.  The public goal is to encourage productivity, to promote work.80  
The ideology of a community working to form its members into productive citizens 
fits much more easily into that framework, than to discard potential members and 
hypothesizing that they may not have been productive members anyhow. 
Additionally, a court following a Lockean moral philosophy reasoned that 
“right[s] … might in some instances be limited … in order to preserve the ‘safety, 
health, morals and general welfare of the public.’”81  Creation of life would seem to 
be a public moral.   
                                                                
73See supra notes 14-15, 24. 
74See supra note 12. 
75Id. 
76Krueckeberg, supra note 33. 
77See supra notes 35-36.  
78Schaffner, supra note 36, at 1087.  
79Id. at 1088.  
80DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 34. 
81Koehlinger, supra note 61, at 737 (citing Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905)).  
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Under this … approach, society’s compelling interest in promoting the 
rational liberty of all will ensure that minority interests that do not unduly 
burden the capacities for rational deliberation and self-direction in others 
will be given at least as much, if not more, protection …. Thus, by 
rethinking the modern privacy cases under this Lockean moral philosophy 
approach, courts can achieve results that are more consistent, analytically 
sound and well-supported by a coherent moral philosophy.82 
Upon determination of how property rights should be allocated and which 
exceptions should be accounted for, one must determine how the government should 
inform the public and enforce these rights.  Locke’s view on legislation is that it 
must be with limitation.83  That is, “because the proper end of civil society is the 
common good and the common good entails ‘the mutual Preservation of their Lives, 
Liberties, and Estates,’ there naturally emerge several important limits to the power 
of the legislature.”84  Locke contended that the legislature must not arbitrarily 
regulate the means by which an individual can achieve rational liberty and 
determined that the best approach to resolving the constitutionality of state regulation 
is to ensure that it does not interfere with an individual’s “asserted right to 
contract.”85 
Thus, Locke has laid down a hierarchy of property principles and those principles 
should be embodied in the laws set forth by the legislature.86  The legislature should 
not enact regulations in regard to property that are not harmonious with that 
hierarchy of principles.87  All of which may be preempted by an individual’s right to 
contract.88  While Locke seems weary of state or federal regulation of an individual’s 
means, he does seem adamant in his belief in the right to contract.  In Lochner v. 
New York, the United States Supreme Court found that: 
The individual’s ‘personal liberty’ is equivalent to his ability to “enter into 
those contracts in relation to labor which may seem to him appropriate or 
necessary for the support of himself and his family.” … [T]he [c]ourt 
recognized as fundamental “the rights of individuals … to make contracts 
regarding labor upon such terms as they may think best, or which they 
may agree upon with the other parties to such contracts.”89  
Allocation of a property interest to an individual who mixes his labor and adds value 
to a resource, and the limitation of that individual’s ability to exert control over that 
resource by disallowing the right to contract, undermines the entire ideology of the 
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labor theory.90  Such a practice would discourage labor and, thus, diverge from every 
principle taught by Locke and embodied in property laws of today.91 
B.  Economic Theory Of Property 
Opponents to Locke’s labor theory believe that in some facets, the ideology is 
limited.92  The limitation is demonstrated through the progression of property 
theorists. Beginning with Locke, property rights theorists assumed that property law 
began in a state of nature in which all goods were dedicated to the commons or 
belonged equally to everyone. 93  However, at some point, parts of the commons 
became sufficiently scarce and it became economically beneficial to reduce portions 
of the commons to private property.94  The incentive of private ownership maximizes 
productivity because not only will people take better care of property that they own 
compared with property shared with the community, but it prevents overconsumption 
of communal property.95  Thus, property rights evolve “in response to changing 
economic conditions.  When a resource becomes more valuable due to changing 
technology or some other ‘exogenous’ shock, property rights over it are specified 
with greater precision.  When the gains from granting and administering rights come 
to exceed the costs, the rights will be granted.”96  Therefore, opponents to Locke’s 
views are of the opinion that property should not be apportioned to those who mix 
their labor with the resource.  Rather, property should be apportioned in accordance 
with economic efficiency and, the theory of law and economics.97 
Judge Richard A. Posner, a proponent of theories of law and economics, warns 
that efficient distribution of property rights requires universality, exclusivity, and 
transferability.98  Universality requires that all property be privately owned and 
valued, allowing an exception for property considered to be an unlimited resource 
that is not devalued by the use of others.99  Whether an embryo is an unlimited 
resource is debatable.  There is an unlimited supply of eggs and an unlimited supply 
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of sperm but a limited resource of money.  Additional factors go into the creation of 
an embryo.  First, there is the willingness of women to donate eggs and men to 
donate sperm.  Next, there is the fact that each embryo is unique, having its own 
separate DNA.  The same is said about snowflakes, but one would hardly argue that 
they are a limited resource.   
In the case of an embryo when that embryo is used by someone else or discarded, 
it diminishes another’s capacity for use.  When looked at in the situations presented 
in the York, Kass, and Davis cases, one can see that an embryo is a limited 
resource.100  For example, Mr. and Mrs. Davis were only able to create seven 
embryos.101  Mrs. Davis sought the right to only seven embryos, and there was no 
immediate prospect that any more embryos from Mrs. Davis’ egg and Mr. Davis’ 
sperm would be forthcoming.102  Therefore, if embryos are limited in supply, an 
efficient property system would require that they be subject to private ownership.103 
To meet the requirement of exclusivity, one must have the ability to prevent 
others from using one’s property.104  Therefore, if an embryo is property, the next 
important element is whose property is it.  If it is determined that the embryo is the 
property of the party seeking to discard it, then that party would be entitled to 
prevent its use.  In contrast, if the party seeking to use the embryo is deemed to have 
the superior property interest, that party may exclude the other party from having any 
authority over the embryo.  Further inquiry into economic efficiency will determine 
who would acquire ownership of the embryo, if that embryo is considered property. 
Transferability is the idea that the value of property is maximized through a 
capitalist market of free exchange.105  Whether such a notion is applicable to an 
embryo must be considered in relation to whether an embryo is property and, 
evaluated along the guidelines of other pieces of property.  Free exchange not only 
implies allowing the market to determine the worth of a resource but also allowing 
that resource to be free from legislative and judicial interference.106 
In the realm of economic theory, property rights should be allocated to shape 
behavior in a manner that maximizes productivity.107   
Proceeding on the basic assumption that man is a rational maximizer of 
his own self-interest, Posner derives certain fundamental concepts: (1) that 
there is an inverse relation between the price charged and the quantity 
demanded of a good; (2) that the cost of a good is the price that the 
resources consumed in making and selling it would command in their 
next-best use; and (3) that resources will gravitate toward their most 
valuable uses if voluntary exchange is permitted.  These basic economic 
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principles lead to the conclusion that the value of a thing is determined by 
the exchanges people will engage in to buy or sell it.  Essentially, what 
this means is that in a free-market system, all goods will be put to their 
best uses because those people who derive the most value from them will 
give the most to obtain them.108 
Posner is known for applying economic theory outside of its traditional domain.  
Posner employed his first fundamental concept, more commonly referred to as the 
law of supply and demand, in the arena of the adoption market.109  He argues that 
regulatory interference in the adoption market has created a shortage of babies and 
allowed for the existence of a black market for babies.110  Such regulation has 
additionally allowed for a surplus of unadopted children remaining in foster homes at 
the public’s expense.111  Posner argues that the most prohibitive regulation is the 
price at which adoption agencies may contract with the birth parents, which prevents 
the adoption market from functioning at equilibrium.112  As such, birth parents who 
place less value in their offspring would be more inclined to place their child up for 
adoption while adoptive parents, who would arguably place a higher value on a 
child’s life, would have the opportunity to adopt.113  Such an argument not only 
illustrates the law of supply and demand but also takes into account the child’s 
welfare. 
It may be inferred that a significant number of couples seeking to adopt children 
are infertile, as exemplified by the tribulations of Mrs. Davis.114  It also may be 
asserted that parties prohibited by courts to use the frozen embryos may consider the 
adoption market, or even the black market for adoption, as the next reasonable 
alternative.  Such an occurrence would add to the demand for babies while 
increasing the shortage, which pulls the adoption market further away from 
equilibrium.  Due to the expense of the IVF process, it is also a logical assumption 
that the majority of couples utilizing IVF procedures are white couples.115  Allowing 
these embryos to become white babies would decrease the shortage of white babies 
and allow for the price of adoption to more closely resemble equilibrium.  Therefore, 
it would seem that, because an embryo has the value of potential life, application of 
Posner’s first fundamental concept would weigh in favor of the party seeking to use 
the embryo. 
                                                                
108Rosendorf, supra note 98, at 704-05.  
109Francesco Parisi & Ben W.F. Depoorter, Continuing Tributes to the Honorable Richard 
A. Posner Private Choices and Public Law: Richard A. Posner’s Contributions to Family Law 
and Policy, 17 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 403 (2001).  
110Id. at 410.  
111Id.   
112Id at 410-11.  
113Id. at 411.  
114Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 591–92. 
115See supra note 5. 
2002-03] FROZEN EMBRYOS 117 
Embodied in Posner’s second fundamental concept dealing with a property’s 
“next-best use” is the idea of “opportunity cost.”116  That is, by utilizing an element 
of property in one way, other uses of the property must be forgone.117  A cost that is 
born by those other than the actors, such as opportunity cost, is an externality.118  
Optimal use of property requires minimization of costs;119 thus, utilization of 
property can only be economically efficient where the costs are outweighed by the 
benefits. 
The opportunity cost in utilizing the embryo in the manner proposed by the party 
seeking non-use is extremely high.  First, it could possibly deny the party seeking to 
use the embryo parenthood.  This is where the “other reasonable means” of 
achieving parenthood rationale may find root in economic theory.  Second, the 
opportunity forgone is that of potential life, which includes all the accomplishments 
of life and how that life may have affected many other lives.  It is this second 
argument that would be most persuasive to Posner.120   
Economic theory warns that, whenever the effects generated by private 
agreements fall on third parties who have not participated in the [decision 
of how the property is utilized] the allocation of resources may diverge 
from the ideal equilibrium … [and economic efficiency] will not be met if 
an exchange has made someone better off while making others worse 
off.121  
Additionally, Posner believes that “[i]n a world of scarce resources, waste should be 
regarded as immoral.”122 
One may question how Posner, being a strong advocate of personal autonomy, 
would evaluate the opportunity cost of the party seeking nonuse of the embryos.123  
Use of the embryos would cause this person a failure to exercise their right to 
privacy and may force him to bear the burden of unwanted parenthood.  Posner 
believes that, “[i]f the cost of vindicating or exercising rights exceeds their marginal 
returns, the claim will not be exercised.”124  That is, if the cost of preventing life of 
the embryo outweighs the benefit the donor would receive by avoiding parenthood, 
the privacy interest is preempted.  Even though Posner is an advocate of personal 
autonomy, he recognizes the need for its sacrifice where exercising such autonomy 
poses too great a cost. 
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Posner’s third fundamental concept of economic theory is that in the ideal market 
place, resources or property will gravitate toward their most valuable use.125  In a 
situation where one party seeks the embryo for implantation and the other party 
wishes for the embryo to be discarded, the embryo’s most valuable use is 
implantation. A discarded embryo can serve no purpose and therefore has no use.  
However, in the situation where one party seeks to use the embryo for implantation 
and the other wishes to allow the IVF clinic to appropriate the embryo for biological 
research, the answer is not as clear.  One could argue that an embryo’s most valuable 
use is its potential for life.  Yet, another may argue that the maximum use of an 
embryo is met through its sacrifice for research, which results in a larger abundance 
of potential life for others. 
According to Posner, the value of a resource or element of property is measured 
by “the exchanges people will engage in to buy or sell it.”126  The question, then, is 
whether an IVF clinic would pay more to obtain the embryo for research or whether 
a party seeking its use would pay more to have the embryo implanted.  Could one 
assume that Posner would advocate that the embryo goes to the highest bidder? 
To answer that question one must look back to the root of economic theory.  The 
basis for economic theory derived from the utilitarian approach to property.127  While 
utilitarianism still favors maximum productivity, it views property as a means to an 
end, and its purpose is to maximize the happiness of all citizens by allocating and 
promoting the general welfare of society.128  Therefore, the issue is whether it is in 
the best interest of society to allow that embryo life or use it for research in the hopes 
that it will allow for others to live.  A utilitarian would choose the means that brings 
about the greatest benefit to society as a whole.129  The 
dichotomy within the self is one that needs to [be] decided between 
choices of ‘consequential’ or ‘deontologic nature’… [For example 
imagine] being faced with the option of torturing a child in order to save 
the rest of the world of all harm.  The consequential component of our 
moral thinking cares about the number of people that will be injured under 
each decision.  By contrast, the ‘deontologic’ component refers to the 
component that will have nothing to do with hurting the child.130  
The economic approach to property law grew out of dissatisfaction with the 
ephemeral concept of human happiness and the difficulty of how it could be 
measured.131   
Given that Posner is a true economist, unhappy with impractical measure of 
human happiness or society welfare, it is likely that Posner would award the embryo 
to the party who would pay more for it.  As noted previously, Posner believes that 
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the person who would value a resource more is the person willing to pay more for 
it.132  Therefore, if an embryo is property, the wealth maximization principle should 
apply. Whether Posner believes that an embryo is property plays an important role, 
which is illuminated by his views on abortion.133  Further investigation into Posner’s 
approach to abortion shows that while economics may pinpoint 
family and gender legal issues and provide some answers, abortion is one 
of those social dilemmas that cannot be solved through economic analysis.  
There is a simple libertarian solution to abortion only if one does not 
consider the fetus’s utility.  Without considering the interest of the fetus, 
the mother should be entitled to abort, subject to the father’s permission if 
an implicit or explicit contract makes the fetus a joint asset.  However, if 
the fetus is a member of society whose welfare counts, such a contact has 
third party effects and may not be presumed to be wealth maximizing.  
Likewise, if one recognizes the sanctity of life and the limits of any social 
policy in the face of such supreme value, no insight can be derived from 
economic analysis or libertarian ideologies.  Since the decision to believe 
in the supreme value of life from the time of conception and the decision 
to include the utility of the fetus in the social welfare calculation is a 
moral one, libertarians and economists have nothing to say on the matter 
of abortion.134 
Therefore, only then, if an embryo is property can economic theory be applied. 
According to Posner, economic theory dictates that if an embryo is property, then 
it should not be discarded.135  In application of all three of his fundamental principles 
the party seeking to use the embryo should prevail.136  The only question arises when 
the dispute ensues between the parties and a contract exists dictating that in such a 
dispute, the embryos should be used by the fertility clinics for biological research.  
To determine the proper outcome one must look to Posner’s disposition on contract 
law. 
Just as adoption principles were used to clarify the fundamental concepts of the 
economic theory, so can Posner’s position on enforceability of surrogacy contracts 
be used to evaluate enforcement of contracts concerning frozen embryos.137  
According to Posner, parties will not enter into a contract unless they believe that it 
will be mutually beneficial.138  Efficiency is the core principle in the economic 
approach to contracts because efficiency maximizes wealth, and in the economic 
world, wealth is how one measures happiness.139  Posner believes that freedom of 
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contract must be held above all else, even in cases where “ex post facto screening of 
fairness and social desirability becomes necessary for the protection of the 
contracting parties and society at large,”140 such as is argued in the case of surrogacy 
contracts.  When contracts are subject to legislative or judicial interference an added 
element of uncertainty exists.141  Uncertainty is contrary to the wealth maximizing 
principle because it lowers the value of a resource due to the fact that the purchasing 
party would have to be compensated for such uncertainty.142  Therefore, enforce 
those contracts that offend social desirability because, just as in the case of any other 
contract, it is in the best interest of the parties to make contracts enforceable.143  
Opponents to enforceability of surrogate contracts argue that Posner’s theory is 
flawed in three areas.144  First, where Posner states that parties enter contracts for a 
mutual benefit because people are “rational maximizers” of their own wealth, 
opponents argue that surrogate mothers cannot fully appreciate how it will feel to 
give up their child before that situation actually occurs.145  Therefore, surrogate 
mothers are not in a position to make an informed decision that maximizes their 
wealth because they underestimate the negative effect that giving up their child will 
have on them.146  This argument may be likened to infertile couples who contract 
away their rights to the embryos before a dispute arises as to their use.147  Parties 
realize that multiple eggs will be harvested, but they may underestimate the amount 
of attempts it will take for a successful IVF procedure.148  Besides underestimating 
the probability that they may actually need every embryo created and given that the 
contract is signed prior to the procedure, they may also underestimate the despair 
they would feel in undergoing the procedure again with another sperm donor.149  One 
especially may underestimate the possibility of a dispute even arising.150 
The second flaw, opponents argue, of Posner’s theory is that he believes that the 
majority of surrogate mothers are women who have already had children and have a 
level of maturity that allows for an informed decision.151  Posner cites empirical data 
that seems to show that it is doubtful that surrogate mothers are poor and desperate 
women driven to rent their bodies as a last option at survival.152  Instead, their 
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motivation is empathy for the father’s infertile wife.153  Opponents argue that the 
level of a woman’s maturity and the fact that she has children is comparable to that 
of an individual blind at birth who cannot truly appreciate what it is to see.154  
Nothing can prepare a woman for giving up a child except actually doing it, 
therefore, neither maturity, having other children, nor publicity of surrogacy cases 
gone sour can truly make surrogate mothers fully informed.155  Again, in comparing 
this situation to that of embryos, the parties cannot truly appreciate the desperation 
they will feel in the need to use those embryos until the time comes when the 
embryos are needed.156 
Third, opponents believe that Posner’s prediction that non-enforcement of 
surrogacy contracts will vastly disadvantage contract law in general is overstated.157  
Instead, adversaries say, surrogates are a unique class of people entitled to special 
protection given the fact that they are not in a position to make a fully informed 
decision when entering into the contract.158  Surely then, infertile couples can be seen 
as a unique class in need of that same protection.  Infertile couples are uninformed as 
to the desperation one party may feel in the inability to use the frozen embryos.  
Although such criticisms exist, Posner, like Locke, holds above all else the right 
to contract.159  Posner, like Locke although for different reasons, advocates the use of 
the embryo.160  Both theorists also recognize that an exception should be recognized 
where the parties have previously contracted upon the matter in dispute.161  Both 
Posner and Locke hold one’s fundamental right to contract so high they advocate that 
such a contract should preempt the fundamental tenants of their respective school of 
thought.162  Additionally, Posner would advocate the use of contracts to avoid 
litigation.163  The cost of litigation is an external cost and as such economists seek to 
elude litigation whenever possible.164 
Another aspect upon which Posner and Locke agree is that of governmental 
interference in the form of promulgating regulation.165  While Posner does not look 
favorably on judicial and legislative intervention, he believes that the regulations that 
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exist should be defined in a clear manner.166 A clear indication of what is expected of 
people will decrease information cost and external costs of litigation.167 For those 
same reasons, rights and regulations should be public, predictable, easily 
discoverable, and more stable than less.168 Posner suggests “generally applicable 
laws, regulations and regulatory procedures, which aid in the discovery of rights 
boundaries and the equitable enforcement of rights and duties as defined.”169 
Institutions of the state should be held responsible and “should have [the] sufficient 
powers, duties, liabilities, and resources … necessary to facilitate the neutral 
validation and enforcement of property rights and duties at the least possible cost.”170  
Public actors should also be held responsible for enforcing these generally applicable 
laws in a faithful manner.171 
III.  CURRENT REGULATION OF EMBRYONIC MATERIALS 
A.  Statements By Expert Agencies 
IVF, in general, is minimally regulated at the federal level.172  In fact, the IVF 
industry operated without any federal regulation for many years.173 However, in 
1992, Congress enacted the Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act.174  
This act called for the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to develop a 
model certification procedure for IVF clinics and laboratories that could be adopted 
by each state, as well as compile IVF pregnancy success statistics to be annually 
reported.175  The purpose for such enactment, besides reporting pregnancy success 
rates, was to universalize consistent IVF procedures in hopes of assuring quality and 
adequate recordkeeping at each certified IVF clinic and laboratory.176  This 
legislation may fail to fulfill its objectives because “clinic certification and reporting 
are voluntary under the Act, with the only penalty for noncompliance being public 
identification as a program that has failed to do so.”177 
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After deeming the IVF procedure ethically acceptable in 1986, the Ethics 
Committee of the American Fertility Society distributed ethical guidelines for IVF.178  
While these guidelines did not formally comment on the moral classifications of 
embryos, the Committee stated that an embryo “deserves greater respect than 
accorded other human tissue, since it has the potential to become a human person, it 
is not accorded the respect of an actual human being.”179  This was the notion 
followed by the Davis court.180  Even though the embryos were equated greater 
deference than mere property, Mr. Davis’ privacy interest coupled with Mrs. Davis’ 
ability to achieve motherhood by other reasonable means allowed for a ruling in 
favor of Mr. Davis.181  
[T]his human potential limits ‘the circumstances in which a[n] … embryo 
may be discarded or used in research and the statute makes clear that 
embryos should not be treated as a person because of a lack of features of 
personhood, individual development, and the possibility of never reaching 
the full biological potential.  Therefore, while … embryos are entitled to 
‘profound respect,’ such respect does not entitle the embryo to full moral 
and legal rights accorded to full persons.182  
Additionally, these guidelines call for the commissioning couple to sign a blanket 
consent form that covers the various steps involved in IVF.  The commissioning 
couple also has sole discretion in deciding the disposition of the embryos as long as 
such disposition is within the medical and ethical standards set forth in the guidelines 
themselves.183 “Similar to the [Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification] Act, 
compliance with the American Fertility Society’s guidelines is purely voluntary.”184 
The Committee on Medicolegal Problems and the Council on Ethical and Judicial 
Affairs of the American Medical Association addressed the ethical and legal issues 
involved in the freezing of excess embryos in the IVF process.  This report made 
three recommendations:    
(1)  Primary authority for frozen … embryos rests with the two gamete 
providers, and  they must agree to any disposition of the … embryos;  
(2)  Agreements by the gamete providers for the future disposition of 
their…embryos should generally be enforceable.  However, either gamete 
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provider should be able to show that changed circumstances make 
enforcement of the agreement unreasonable.  The gamete providers should 
not be required to enter into an agreement that will govern the future 
disposition of their … embryos; (3) Frozen … embryos may be used by 
the gamete providers, donated for use by other parties, or donated for 
research.  The frozen … embryo may also be allowed to thaw and 
deteriorate.185 
In a letter to the editor of the Journal of the American Medical Association, an 
individual voiced the concerns of the medical community.186  The letter predicted 
that allowing the donation of embryos to other parties would result in the 
commodification of children.187  The author argued that the donation of embryos 
would cause the resulting child emotional harm due to the inability to identify with 
the non-biological parents and the lack of information concerning family 
background, inherited diseases, and overall knowledge of medical and genetic 
heritage.188  Additionally, the recommendations given by the Journal “were criticized 
for failing to ‘offer a convincing moral and legal rationale for giving gamete 
providers absolute discretion over the fate of frozen embryos’ and suggested that 
such a rationale be developed.”189 
The Board of Trustees replied to these criticisms by standing its ground on its 
recommendation to donate embryos, stating that such donation is not commercially 
motivated but motivated by altruistic sentiments.190  Additionally, the Board stated 
that the emotional development of a resulting child is at best speculative and that “it 
is difficult to conclude that [he/she] would have been better off not being born.”191  
The Board did concede that embryos should under no circumstances be sold.192 
Posner argues that economic efficiency calls for rules to be easily discoverable 
and adequately and informatively defined.193  Additionally, Posner pronounces that 
institutions of the state be vested with the power to sufficiently enforce the 
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distribution of rights.194  Locke and Posner further contend that if regulation is 
needed, it must not be arbitrary.195  The regulations set forth by these administrative 
agencies do not meet the requirements set forth by Locke and Posner.  The first 
criticism is that they are voluntary, which cannot only be considered arbitrary, but 
does very little to guide state legislators or the courts, increasing external information 
and judicial costs.196  These regulations anticipate arguments of a lack of informed 
consent by requiring the reporting of results and statistics as well as having the 
commissioning couple sign consent forms, but do not rise to the extent of quashing 
the argument.197  Additionally, the Ethics Committee of the American Fertility 
Society blurs the line between property and non-property by creating a separate 
quasi-property category for the embryo.198  However, the regulation fails to dictate to 
the state legislatures or the courts what guidelines should be applied to this new class 
of property.  Finally, while it seems that the institution of contract law would supply 
the only means for universality in the treatment of embryos, the Committee on 
Medicolegal Problems and the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the 
American Medical Association states that couples do not have to contract as to the 
disposition of the embryos in the case of a dispute.199 
Current state statutes reflect some of the ideologies set forth by the foregoing 
expert agencies.200  Some states choose to categorize an embryo as a person and 
therefore apply moral guidelines to its treatment.201  These statutes address the 
physical and psychological welfare of the resulting child, while at times ignoring 
regulation of the IVF procedure itself.  Other states dictate that an embryo is 
property, yet in some instances fail to apply property rationales to its treatment.202  
Still, other states refuse to label the embryo as either property or non-property, 
leaving that burden on the court.203  The classification as to property or non property 
is further skirted through reverence to contract law. 
B.  Current State Statutes 
Due to the lack of federal regulation, states retain the power to enact and adopt 
their own legislation concerning IVF procedures. These statutes vary vastly from one 
another and act to prohibit universal and consecutive outcomes between states.204  
Given that many of the states do not give proper direction to the court, they do little 
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to reduce information and judicial costs as well as prohibit universal and consecutive 
outcomes within a state. 
The most restrictive statute is the law in Louisiana.205  Louisiana law regards an 
embryo as a “person” and, therefore, prohibits it from being purposely destroyed.206  
Under the statute all embryos must be transferred to a uterus.207  If the 
commissioning couple, by notarial act, gives up their right to implantation, then their 
embryos must be made available for adoptive implantation.208  While in a state of 
cryopreservation, an embryo is “not property of the physician, IVF clinic, or the 
gamete donors.  The embryo can sue or be sued, but the state does not award 
inheritance rights unless the embryo develops into a child born in a live birth.”209 
Additionally, the commissioning couple’s rights are preserved only where they 
disclose their identity; where no such disclosure is made, the treating physician is 
deemed to be the temporary guardian over the frozen embryo(s).210 
In contrast, a Virginia statute considers embryos to be the property of the donor 
or commissioning couple.211  With respect to the commissioning couple, the IVF 
clinic has the legal rights and duties of a bailee.212  While the Virginia statute is more 
consumer-oriented because it calls for IVF clinics to disclose to the couple the 
likelihood of procedural success,213 it does not provide for the disposition of the 
embryos if the couples disagree. 
An Illinois statute bans the sale of a fetus as well as experimentation upon a 
fetus.214  The statute further defines an unborn child as “any individual of the human 
species from fertilization until birth.”215  Additionally, while the Illinois statute 
allows for the harvesting and implantation involved in the IVF procedure, it provides 
ambiguous language as to the disposal of remaining embryos.216  Therefore, the 
courts are left with the decision as to whether the word “fetus” is synonymous with 
“embryo.”217 
                                                                
205Malo, supra note 172, at 313.  
206Id. 
207Id. at 314. 
208Id.  
209Id. at 313. 
210Godoy, supra note 185. 
211
 Malo, supra note 172, at 314. 
212Id. 
213Mary Ann Davis Moriarty, Addressing In Vitro Fertilization and the Problem of 
Multiple Gestations, 18 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 503, 513 (1999). 
214Malo, supra note 172, at 315. 
215Id. (citing 720 ILCS 5/9-1.2(3)(b) (West 1993)).  
216Id.  
217Id. 
2002-03] FROZEN EMBRYOS 127 
Pennsylvania enacted IVF legislation as a part of its abortion statute.218  The 
statute calls for quarterly reports to be filed by IVF clinics and made available to the 
public.219  The information in these reports shall include: the location and personnel 
of the clinic, the number of eggs fertilized, the number of embryos destroyed or 
discarded, and the number of women implanted through IVF at each clinic.220  While 
this statute holds IVF clinics more accountable to the public, it provides little 
guidance as to whether an embryo is property, if so who’s property, and what should 
be done in the case of a dispute between the commissioning parties.  Additionally, 
the statute does not adequately put the public on notice of the success rate of IVF 
procedures.221  Nor does it inform participating couples as to the risks associated with 
the procedure or the complications that arise due to decisions concerning excess 
embryos.  
A New Hampshire statute requires that a couple wishing to participate in IVF be 
medically evaluated and deemed medically acceptable.222  Additionally, the statute 
requires that the couple be examined by a psychiatrist, psychologist, pastoral 
counselor or social worker licensed to practice in the state of New Hampshire.223  
The purpose of the psychiatric evaluation is said to ensure the couple’s ability to give 
the potential child love, affection, and guidance.224  Records of the findings and 
conclusions are kept by those performing the evaluation.225  The commissioning 
couple must waive their rights against disclosure of confidential information and 
communications between doctor or counselor-type professionals by causing a copy 
of the findings and conclusion to be filed with the court.226  Additionally, a licensed 
child placement agency or the department of Health and Human Services must 
conduct a home study and monitor the potential IVF couple.227  The purpose of the 
home study is to assess the potential IVF couple’s ability to provide shelter, food, 
clothing, medical care, and other basic necessities to the child.228  While the New 
Hampshire statute is most intrusive into the potential IVF couple’s privacy for the 
overall welfare of the child, the statute fails to regulate the IVF procedure itself.229   
Under Florida law, a couple participating in an IVF procedure must enter into a 
written agreement with their treating physician providing for the disposition of 
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frozen embryos upon divorce, death of a spouse, or any other unforeseen events.230  
Although a written agreement is required under the Florida statute, the statute also 
regulates cases where no written agreement exists.231  In the absence of a written 
agreement, the statute grants the commissioning couple joint decision-making 
authority.232  However, the statute fails to address the situation, such as divorce, in 
which the couple disagrees as to the disposition of frozen embryos, and where no 
written agreement is in existence.   
IV.  OUTCOME DETERMINATION THROUGH CONTRACT LAW 
In order to ensure consistent outcomes, the Florida statute suggest that the 
legislature be compelled to dictate that IVF clinics enter into contracts witth the 
commissioning parents addressing the disposition of embryos.  This argument is 
harmonious with the teachings of both Locke and Posner.233  The rationale is that 
these contracts should govern in events such as divorce, the death of a party, or when 
a party simply changes his/her mind.  In actuality, the enforceability of such 
contracts is being challenged through the doctrine of changed circumstances, the 
special principles applied to adhesion contracts, and the idea that such contracts 
should be void as against public policy.234 
For a contract to be enforceable: (1) one party must make an “offer” to the other, 
(2) which must then be “accepted” by the other party, and (3) that offer and 
acceptance must be supported by an exchange of “consideration.”235  An offer 
involves a proposal to enter into an agreement.  It is a promise made by one party to 
the other of what he/she will do in exchange for a promise or act by the other 
party.236  An offer takes place when one party communicates to the other a 
willingness to enter into an agreement in such a way that justifies the other party in 
concluding that an enforceable agreement will result if they accept.237 
An IVF clinic offers to perform the IVF procedure to the commissioning couple 
for payment and for acceptance to the terms and conditions placed on that offer.  The 
condition placed on that offer is the disposition of the frozen embryos should the 
couple disagree as to their use.  
Acceptance to an offer occurs when the offeree, by words or conduct, 
demonstrates “unconditional assent to the terms of the offer … Acceptance may be 
reasonably implied by words or conduct.”238  The commissioning couple accepts the 
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offer made by the IVF clinic by signing the contract.  The terms that the couple 
accepts encompass the clause dictating the fate of the embryos in case the couple 
disagrees as to their use. 
Consideration is present when the promise or performance represents a 
bargained-for exchange.239  “A promise or performance is bargained-for if it is 
sought by one party in exchange for his promise.  Consideration can consist of a 
promise, an act, or a promise not to do something that a party has a legal right to 
do.”240  Consideration can be demonstrated through “a benefit to the other party 
making the promise to which he is not already lawfully entitled, or any detriment to 
the other, that he was not already lawfully bound to suffer.”241 
The consideration in a contract between the commissioning couple is the 
bargained-for exchange of a promise of payment for services.  That is, the couple 
seeks the promise by the IVF clinic to perform the IVF procedure and pays a fee for 
that promise. 
Given that a contract between a commissioning couple can theoretically meet all 
the elements of an enforceable contract, it seems as though requiring IVF clinics to 
execute such contracts before allowing a couple to participate in IVF procedures 
would be the most administratively effective method.  However, such contracts may 
not be enforceable where a defense exists against their enforcement.  Commentators 
suggest that one possible defense is the doctrine of changed circumstances.242 
Nonperformance of a contract may be excused for changed circumstances as 
expressed in §§ 261-272 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.243  For a 
subsequent event to be deemed a changed circumstance for the purpose of 
performance excusal, “the party seeking relief must establish that both parties 
assumed at the time of contracting that the changed circumstances would not occur 
and the changed circumstances made performance as agreed impracticable.”244 If 
performance as agreed upon would be impracticable, then the duty to perform is 
discharged.245  Therefore, the defense of changed circumstance requires 
impracticability and lack of foreseeability.246 Impracticability is best explained 
through a commercial context.247  “Under this interpretation, the promisor was 
excused for nonperformance when, due to changed circumstances, the performance 
still could be performed, but only at excessive and unreasonable cost.”248  Is, then, 
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the cost of the forgone use of the embryos excessive and unreasonable? Does the 
party’s ability to achieve parenthood by other reasonable means affect the answer? 
In addition to impracticability, in the arena of changed circumstance, courts tend 
to look at whether the subsequent events were foreseeable by the parties.249  
Therefore, even if performance of the contract is impracticable, a party’s 
performance may not be excused where the subsequent event or changed 
circumstance could have been foreseen or anticipated by the parties.250  Here, parties 
in favor of allowing the doctrine of changed circumstance in contracts between IVF 
clinic and commissioning couples propose that while a party may be charged with 
the ability to foresee the possibility of certain subsequent events, the couple could 
not foresee the feelings associated with those events.251  As described earlier in the 
surrogate setting, a mother cannot know what it is to give up a child until she has 
done so.252  The same argument could be made that a woman cannot know her 
desperation to use the embryos until she is faced with the fact of having them 
destroyed. 
One argument is premised on the fact that the doctrine of changed circumstances 
will apply to any clause restricting the distribution of embryos because of the great 
amount of time that passes.253  This notion involves the inability to predict how one 
may feel when the disagreement arises and the clause governing the disposition of 
the embryo is triggered.254 “Furthermore, it would be inequitable to bind the parties 
to a reproductive decision made at a time when their needs and interests may have 
been completely different.”255  These needs and interests may have changed 
drastically during the passage of years between the commissioning  couple’s decision 
to undergo IVF, having excess embryos frozen, and their subsequent decision over 
the use of those embryos.256  Even the Kass court recognized these difficulties due to 
the uncertainty inherent in the IVF procedure.257 “The court listed ‘[d]ivorce; death, 
disappearance or incapacity of one or both partners; aging; [and] the birth of other 
children’ as being among some of the obvious changes in circumstances that might 
take place over time.”258  For example, as we have seen in prior case discussion, 
during a divorce one party may strongly feel that he/she does not want offspring to 
result from the failed marriage.259  Should that party still be bound to a clause in the 
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IVF contract that states that the excess frozen embryos shall be rewarded to the party 
who intends them to be implanted?  What results in the situation where the parties 
contracted to have the embryos discarded and, facing divorce, one party believes that 
implantation of those embryos is the only possibility of becoming a parent?260  “In 
either case, the claim of unfairness due to changed circumstance injects legal 
uncertainty into the situation.”261  Recently, scholars have also addressed the issue of 
changed circumstance in IVF contracts in situations where the woman has undergone 
premature menopause since the embryos had been frozen or for a number of reasons 
she could not safely repeat the egg retrieval process.262  
Opponents to the doctrine of changed circumstance in the IVF setting argue that 
one should not be relieved of their contractual agreement, despite the change in 
circumstances, unless she did not knowingly or freely enter into that agreement.263  
Additionally, these scholars argue the strength of the privacy interest for that party 
wishing to avoid unwanted parenthood, and advocate that it is unfair to place such a 
burden on a person especially when that person believed that their privacy interest 
was protected by the IVF contract.264  In making the  
agreement the parties had the opportunity jointly to determine their 
reproductive futures.  Holding them to the agreement recognizes their 
procreative liberty, gives the couple and the IVF program clear guidance, 
and also provides courts with an efficient means of resolving such 
disputes.  The issue in such cases should be whether in fact there was a 
validly made agreement that covers the issue at hand, and not whether 
such agreements should be enforced despite a party’s change of mind or 
circumstance.265 
Additionally, scholars argue that the problems of foreseeability and changed 
circumstances arising in the disposition of embryos are not different from those that 
arise in a wide gamma of other agreements, which are held to be binding despite a 
subsequent event that makes enforcement of the contract undesirable for one party.266 
In response, proponents contend that the application of the doctrine of changed 
circumstances to prevent the enforcement of IVF contracts, in certain circumstances, 
is good policy.267  “[I]t would be inconsistent to acknowledge all of the difficulties in 
making this type of contract only to allow it to be enforced in all circumstances.”268  
While such commentators concede that IVF contracts should not be disregarded for 
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mere change of mind, proponents believe that where the events were unforeseeable, 
or the enforcement would be unconscionable, a party’s non-performance should be 
excused due to the speculative nature inherent in such contracts.269 
Where the doctrine of changed circumstance is granted to excuse performance of 
a contract, the performance promised is completely discharged rather than reformed 
or adjusted by the court.270  Once performance is discharged, the remedies for the 
promise “include compensation for work done and restitution only to the extent that 
he has conferred a benefit on the other party by way of part performance or 
reliance.”271  Reliance beyond the scope of restitution is likely to be unrecoverable. 
The remedy provided in the doctrine of changed circumstance seems to be applicable 
to the disposition of frozen embryos while other contract remedies do not, because of 
the inability to conform the embryos to other traditional contract remedies. 
Other scholars contend that such contracts may be unenforceable due to the fact 
that they are contracts of adhesion.  In such a setting they may be unconscionable.272  
Unconscionability, “in certain situations, could be considered something that is not 
only unexpected but also hard on the complaining party.”273  Unconscionability can 
arise in contracts of adhesion.274   
“An adhesion contract is a standardized form contract offered to consumers of 
goods and services on essentially a take-it-or-leave-it basis, without affording the 
consumer a realistic opportunity to bargain.”275  The vast majority of consumer 
transactions in this country involve contracts of adhesion.276  Under a contract of 
adhesion, a consumer cannot obtain the desired service or product without accepting 
the terms of the form contract.277  This is especially apparent in the IVF setting, 
where the couple does not have a chance to decide the disposition.  Instead, the IVF 
contract contains a boilerplate provision stating that the embryos will be donated to 
the IVF clinic, in case dispute arises.  In most instances, a couple cannot obtain the 
IVF procedure without consenting to the IVF clinic’s terms for embryo 
distribution.278  Thus, it is easy to see how IVF contracts can be viewed as contracts 
of adhesion.  The question remains as to whether these adhesion contracts rise to the 
level of unconscionability.  
Unequal bargaining power may exist between the commissioning couple and the 
IVF clinic considering that couples are often in a fragile emotional state at the time 
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of contacting the IVF clinic because of their failed attempts at achieving offspring.279  
Additionally, commissioning couples do not possess the same level of expertise as 
the IVF clinics and the couples are limited in choosing another clinic because of 
geographical constraints and the limited number of IVF clinics in existence.280  These 
inequalities give further evidence that contracts between IVF clinics and the 
commissioning couples are contracts of adhesion.281  Given that IVF clinics are 
private institutions, they have the power to determine their institutional policies on 
the disposition of embryos and, therefore, have monopoly power over the choices a 
couple can have concerning embryo disposition.282  Therefore, a clinic opposed to a 
certain method of embryo distribution has no obligation to make that method 
available to the couple.283 
Although the terms of an adhesion contract may not be unconscionable, 
enforcement of the contract may be unconscionable due to the circumstances of the 
parties.284  While unconscionability is difficult to define, a suggested definition is 
that a provision is unconscionable if it is such that “no fair-minded person would 
impose on another and that no competent person would freely and knowingly submit 
to.”285  This could lead to a claim that no fair-minded person would give away 
embryos that she intended to implant or that no-fair minded person would impose 
unwanted parenthood on themselves or someone else.286 
Historically, adhesion contracts “were developed in response to economic 
factors.  During the early rise of capitalism, most exchanges took place at arms 
length.  But, as the economy evolved … such contracts of adhesion became prevalent 
due to their efficient and utilitarian function.”287  Under these circumstances, it is no 
surprise, then, that Posner would oppose the idea of finding IVF contracts 
unconscionable solely because they are contracts of adhesion.  Not only is Posner a 
proponent of contract enforcement, but he is also a champion of economic 
efficiency.288 
Additionally, some commentators argue that contracts for the disposition of 
embryos should be likened to that of surrogacy contracts.289  Surrogacy contracts, 
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where the surrogate is being paid for actually giving the baby up for adoption rather 
than for the gestational services involved in carrying the child, are void as against 
public policy.290  This can be likened to the disposition of frozen embryos through an 
argument founded by Posner’s adversaries.  That is, a woman lacks the ability to 
truly consent to giving up her child or her embryo because she cannot appreciate the 
emotional trauma that may ensue until actually completing the action.291  The flaw of 
this argument is that surrogacy agreements lack enforceability because the bargained 
for exchange is compensation for giving up a child rather than the labor associated 
with the gestational services.292  Such a situation arises where payment is made 
conditional upon giving up the child.293  Therefore, the argument of Posner’s 
adversaries becomes applicable only where a state labels an embryo as a person 
cloaked with all rights given to persons in the Constitution. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The end result is a slippery slope among the classifications of an embryo as 
property, person, or a special category of quasi-property rights.  If an embryo is 
property, then it should be disposed of according to property guidelines.  These 
property guidelines are laid out in the theories of Locke and Posner.294  Both Locke 
and Posner suggest that an embryo should be treated as property because reducing a 
resource to private ownership allows for a proper reward and, thus, motivation for 
labor as well as economic efficiency.295  Great deference should be given to these 
theorists because their teachings gave birth to property law.296  History dictates that 
where such schools of thought are not followed the results are misappropriation of 
resources and communal failure.297  Therefore, where a dispute arises as to the 
distribution of an embryo and no contract governs such a dispute, that embryo should 
be treated as property and awarded to the party seeking its use.  Resources are more 
highly regarded when reduced to private property.298  Additionally, the use of that 
property, rather than its waste, not only maximizes happiness through allowing that 
property to become valued, but promotes a more economic efficient society by not 
allowing for the resource to spoil and, thus, accrue no economic benefit.299 
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Both Locke and Posner hold contract law in the highest regard.300  While it is 
fulfilling and economically sound to be rewarded individual ownership over an entity 
with which one has mixed his/her own labor, it is equally important to protect one’s 
freedom to contract.  Contract law is as basic to communal survival as property 
distribution.301  While contracts with IVF clinics have inherent complications, these 
trouble areas do not rise to the level of concern associated with surrogacy 
contracts.302  Surrogacy contracts are void as against public policy and 
unconscionable solely when they embody an agreement that in essence is payment 
for a child (deemed a person by law) rather than for gestational services.303  
Additionally, adhesion contracts are a product of their economic efficiency and 
enforced in a wide range of situations everyday.304  Rights that evolve due to the 
need for economic efficiency are the basis of the law and economic theory.305  Thus, 
contracts between commissioning couples and IVF clinics cannot be void solely on 
the basis that they are contracts of adhesion.  In the name of economic efficiency and 
maximization of happiness of society as a whole, contracts between IVF clinics and 
commissioning couples must be enforced where they meet the enforceability 
requirements laid down by contract law. 
Although Posner and Locke do not revere federal regulation,306 it seems to be the 
only solution to reach the preferred end of contract formation prior to engaging in the 
IVF process. Whether or not an embryo is property, its ultimate fate can be decided 
through contract without reverence to its social standing.  Thus, it is up to the federal 
government to enact legislation that requires all states to create statutes requiring 
IVF clinics to enter into a contractual agreement with the commissioning couple 
concerning the disposition of embryos upon a disagreement as to their use.  This 
legislation should be specific and give proper direction to IVF clinics and the courts 
to minimize external administrative costs.  These statutes should also be sensitive to 
and anticipate the previous attacks on the enforceability of such contracts.  For 
example, IVF clinics could be compelled to allow for the commissioning couple to 
be informed of all of their options and be allowed to freely choose the means of 
distribution with which they are most comfortable.  That is, an IVF clinic should be 
restricted from limiting these options or only allowing for one option such as that the 
embryos be donated to the clinic for research.  Additionally, the subject of embryo 
disposition should be written in a bold or conspicuous type or be a separate 
agreement from that of the general IVF contract.  The commissioning couple should 
be separately advised on this matter and informed of all the consequences of their 
decision.  A mandatory waiting period between this counseling session and 
execution of the contract should be compelled through such statutes.  Following  
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these recommendations would diminish arguments enforceability and improve the 
bargaining ability and the quality of the informed consent of the commissioning 
couple. 
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